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This paper analyses the regulatory framework for renewable electricity in 
Palestine. The State of Palestine has inherited accumulative problems in its 
electricity sector, as in many other sectors, mainly due to the Israeli occupation of 
the Palestinian Territories since June 1967. These territories include the West 
Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. The Occupied Palestinians 
Territories were declared by the United Nations’ General Assembly in September 
2012 to hold a non-member state status, and has since been known as the ‘State of 
Palestine’. Multi-faceted limitations and restrictions resulting from the occupation 
have impeded development in the electricity sector as a pivotal public service. 
However, the Palestinian Government has recently attempted to take control over 
electricity and to restructure the sector using legal instruments. The government 
has adopted regulations and embraced a target to promote the use of renewable 
energy sources for the generation of electricity. This paper argues that despite the 
Palestinian Government’s attempt to achieve the renewable target, the law needs 
to be revised thoroughly to ensure increased promotion of alternative energy 
generation sources. 
Keywords: Palestine, electricity, law, policy, renewable energy, renewable 
energy target, solar energy, feed-in tariff, auction, tax incentives 
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I. Introduction 
Palestine is a Middle Eastern non-member observer state located in southwest Asia, and 
is one of the Middle East and North Africa countries. The state’s jurisdiction currently 
encompasses two separate territories: the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the 
Gaza Strip. Following the Oslo Accord in 1993, the two regions were brought under 
Palestinian self-autonomy following almost five decades of Israeli occupation.1 In the 
Oslo Accord, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation represented the Palestinian people 
in general, and they were considered by the international community to hold observer 
status.2 However, a recent United Nations (UN) resolution in 2012 recognises the State of 
Palestine as a non-member state observer.3 Currently, the State of Palestine has around 
4.75 million inhabitants who are living in and distributed across the West Bank, including 
East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The state has reached a very low gross domestic 
product per capita of USD 425.9 in 2015.4 Meanwhile, the projected number of 
Palestinians in the world is 12.37 million, of whom 1.47 million reside in Israel and 5.46 
million reside in Arab countries.5 
 
Palestine has an insecure energy sector, and the state mostly relies on imports 
from Israel, Jordan and Egypt.6 There are several Israeli restrictions that affect economic 
development in the Palestinian Territories, such as limitations on imports and exports and 
                                                          
1 This agreement was signed on 13 September 1993 between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and 
the Government of Israel and was called the Declaration of Principles Oslo Accord I; see 
<www.peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-osloaccord93> accessed 2 October 2015 
2 Observer Status for the Palestine Liberation Organization, GA Res 3237 (XXIX), 29th sess, 2296th plen 
mtg (22 November 1974); for further information refer to <http://palestineun.org/status-of-palestine-at-the-
united-nations/> 
3 Status of Palestine in the United Nations, GA Res 67/19, 67th sess, 44th plen mtg, Agenda Item 37, UN 
Doc A/RES/67/19 (29 November 2012) 
4 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), ‘Press Report: Preliminary Estimates of Quarterly 
National Accounts’ (First Quarter 2015) 7. 
5 PCBS, ‘The Palestinians at the End of 2015’, 
<www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/512/default.aspx?tabID=512&lang=en&ItemID=1566&mid=3171&wversion=Stag
ing> accessed 22 May 2016. 
6 World Bank Group, ‘Assessment and Action Plan to Improve Payment for Electricity Services in the 
Palestinian Territories: Study on Electricity Sector Contribution to Net Lending, Executive Summary’ 
(2014) 15. 
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total Israeli control of borders and ports (land, sea and air).7 Internal political, legal, 
technical and financial factors also obstruct development, including that of the electricity 
sector. For example, the political dispute between the major Palestinian factions (Hamas 
and Fatah) since 2006 and the absence of a complete quorum inside the Palestinian 
legislative council have impeded the development of legislative process and resulted in 
the issuance of dual laws in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.8 In implementing their 
legislative power, former and current governments in both the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip have issued separate sets of decrees on diverse issues, and this, in turn, has led to 
non-unified legislation in the two jurisdictions.9 However, in June 2014, the factions 
partially solved this dispute by reaching a national consensus that led to the establishment 
of a national Unity Government. It was agreed that the Unity Government would rule for 
six months until new presidential and legislative council elections could be declared.10 
Despite exerted efforts, the new Unity Government did not resolve the legal problems 
that had been accumulating since the beginning of the political separation. In fact, the 
Unity Government did not possess full sovereignty over all Palestinian jurisdictions due 
to a number of internal and external impediments that are outside the scope of this paper. 
Ultimately, the Unity Government resigned in June 2015, and the political separation was 
reinstated and remains in place at the time of writing.11 
 
A lack of basic energy facilities also contributes to the vulnerability of the energy 
sector in Palestine. For example, in the West Bank, there are no sufficient and qualified 
storage capacities for the petroleum derivatives that are necessary to operate future power 
plants.12 Due to the increasing consumption of electricity, insufficient electricity supply 
                                                          
7 Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MoPAD), ‘Sustainable Development under Israeli 
Occupation: Achievements and Challenges’ (2012) 51. 
8 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Palestine Human Development Report: Development 
for Empowerment’ (2014) 21, 71–72. 
9 There were many decree laws issued during the duration of the dispute, and the next sections will provide 
examples of similar decrees, especially with regards to electricity regulation and renewable energy 
exploitation. 
10 BBC, ‘Hamas and Fatah Unveil Palestinian Reconciliation Deal’ <www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-27128902> accessed 22 June 2016. 
11 ALJAZEERA, ‘Palestinian Unity Government Resigns’ <www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/palestinian-
unity-government-resigns-150617125314649.html> accessed 22 June 2016. 
12 MoPAD, ‘Palestinian National Plan 2011–13: Energy Sector Strategy’ (2011–13) 3. 
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has become a critical issue affecting roughly one-third of total energy consumption in the 
Palestinian jurisdiction.13 In Palestine, only the Gaza Power Generating Company serves 
the Gaza Strip, and electricity import exceeds production.14 The single power plant 
supplies nearly one-third of the Gaza Strip’s needs, with approximately 63% and 8% 
imported from Israel and Egypt, respectively.15 Moreover, the plant was critically 
damaged by airstrikes during an Israeli assault in July 2014, and since then has operated 
with reduced capacity.16 This has affected every aspect of life in Gaza: the regular power 
cuts leave the enclave in a blackout for hours and paralyse its economic wheel.17 While 
there are various factors contributing to this humanitarian catastrophe, the major impact 
is made by the siege and war on the Strip. Further, future consumption of electricity in 
Palestine is expected to reach 8,400 gigawatts by 2020 as the consumption rate grows 6% 
annually.18 It is also worth noting that the aging grid and illegal connections to the grid 
by individuals have resulted in a 10% loss of imported electricity.19 ∗ This implies that the 
current level at which electricity is being provided in Palestine cannot meet the increasing 
demand. 
                                                          
13 MoPAD, Sustainable Development (n 7) 57. 
14 PCBS, ‘Quantity of Electricity Imported and Purchased (MWh) in Palestine by Source and Month’ 
(2013) <www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Energy-2013-03e.htm> accessed 13 December 
2015; total imported electricity for 2013 was 4,734 GW, whereas the produced electricity was 0.4026 
GW. 
15 PCBS, Quantity of Electricity (n 14); the Gaza Strip imported 1.327 GW of electricity and produced 
0.402 GW of electricity in 2013; OCHA, ‘The Humanitarian Impact of Gaza’s Electricity and Fuel Crisis’ 
(2015) <http://gaza.ochaopt.org/2015/07/the-humanitarian-impact-of-gazas-electricity-and-fuel-crisis/> 
accessed 22 March 2016; Report on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People, 62nd sess, 
Provisional Agenda Item 10(b), UN Doc TD/ B/62/3 (14–25 September 2015) 6. 
16 Ministry of National Economy, ‘The National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza’ (2014) 
35; Palestine Electric Company, ‘Annual Report’ (2014) accessed through 
<www.pec.ps/Control/Files/Final%20Eng%20PEC%20AR014-25Mar2015-FINAL%20TO%20PRINT2-
SMALL.pdf5516940494ef0.pdf>. 
17 Roger Coma Cunill and Sara Badiei, ‘A Brighter Future for Gaza?’ (Voices and Views: Middle East and 
North Africa, 16 June 2016) <http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/brighter-future-gaza> accessed 23 
June 2016; Ma’an News Agency, ‘Temporary Solution Reached for Gaza Electricity Crisis Amid Tax 
Dispute’ <https://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=771313> accessed 23 June 2016. 
18 Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), ‘Renewable Energy in the Palestinian Territory: 
Opportunities and Challenges, Round Table 4’ (2012) 2. 
19 Palestinian Electricity Regulatory Council (PERC), ‘Annual Second Report’ (2012) (author’s trans). 
<www.perc.ps/ar/files/publications/annualreport2012ar.pdf> accessed 16 January 2016. 
∗All translations in the article are by the author, except where otherwise indicated. 
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II. Electricity Sector Regulation 
Electricity continues to be a challenge for the Palestinian Government for a number of 
reasons. First, the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) overwhelmingly dominates the 
electricity utilised in Palestine, as it supplies about 87.7% of Palestinian electricity 
consumed, mostly through bilateral contracts with local councils.20 This dependence on 
the IEC is somewhat attributed to the restraints of the Protocol on Economic Relations 
(the Paris Protocol).21 For example, fuel is a major element in the electricity industry, but 
the fuel imported to the Palestinian Territories must meet US and European Union 
standards.22 As the regular fuel supply from Egypt and Jordan does not always adhere to 
these standards, Palestine is forced to import fuel from Israel, and consequently, 
electricity from the IEC.23 
Israel, as the occupier authority, holds the responsibility of organising the 
electricity services until a governing power is delivered to the Palestinians in a final 
status agreement.24 However, the Israeli Government has not carried out its responsibility 
to serve the Palestinian population, which is under Israeli administrative and security 
control, particularly in a major portion of the Palestinian area (i.e., the so-called ‘Area C’, 
which forms about 60% of the occupied West Bank).25 The Israeli Government’s 
occupation policies on the ground, in addition to its neglect of the status of Palestine as 
an observer non-member state and the newly agreed upon Palestinian Government, have 
recently brought the conflict to the foreground and, consequently, increased the tension 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians.26 Recently, the UN has asserted that Israel has 
                                                          
20 MoPAD, Energy Sector Strategy (n 12). 
21 Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization PLO, representing the Palestinian people, Annex 4, signed on 29 April 1994. It is the so-
called ‘Paris Protocol’, and it is an integral part of the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, 
which was signed on 4 May1994. 
22 MoPAD, Energy Sector Strategy (n 12) 2. 
23 MAS, Renewable Energy in the Palestinian Territory (n 18); imported electricity bills cost around 400–
500 million in US dollars annually. 
24 World Bank Group (n 6) 5–12. 
25 MoPAD, Sustainable Development (n 7) 20; UNDP (n 8) 53; according to the Oslo II Agreement 1995, 
‘Area C’ refers to Palestinian populated districts that should be under Israeli governance regarding both 
administrative and security issues; OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Atlas’ (2015) 
<www.ochaopt.org/documents/atlas_2015_web.pdf> accessed 22 March 2016, 22, the maps in the atlas 
show the access to land and livelihood in Area C. 
26 UNDP (n 8) 18; Ministry of National Economy (n 16) 15. 
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violated Palestinian natural resources, which are under the sovereignty of the 
Palestinians, including its electricity network.27 Meanwhile, the Palestinian Unity 
Government attempted to reach a fair power agreement with the IEC, but no feasible 
agreement emerged to resolve the power issues. 
 
In the absence of a formally binding electricity agreement with the Israelis, the 
IEC, which is a de facto Israeli energy generation company, illegally dominates the 
Palestinians’ electricity and its price.28 A formally binding electricity agreement is 
therefore necessary to preserve the Palestinians’ electricity rights and to curb the 
monopoly of the IEC. Unfortunately, neither the Paris Protocol nor the Oslo Accord 
resolved the electricity issues between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli 
Government. Fundamentally, the Palestinian Government needs to claim the amendment 
of the key agreement, the Paris Protocol, to free the electricity sector from Israeli energy 
constraints and total control. The future amended agreement must incorporate the basic 
rights of Palestinians to control their energy resources. Any future electricity agreement 
to be developed with the Israeli Government must stipulate the Palestinians’ easy access 
to, and reasonable control of, all components of the Palestinian electricity system. This 
agreement needs to explicitly express the right of the Palestinians to develop future 
generation plants and to have full control over an economically viable electricity sector. 
In line with this agreement, Israel should remove the additional fee imposed on the 
electricity exported to the Palestinians. The savings of the fee can help to support future 
Palestinian renewable projects directly, instead of contributing to Israel’s renewable 
electricity through the IEC. Curbing the activities of Israeli renewable energy companies 
across East Jerusalem and Area C is another fundamental issue. Any new agreement 
should emphasise that the Palestinian Government has the sole right of organising and 
granting the concession for businesses that work in renewable electricity deployment 
across these areas. 
                                                          
27 Permanent Sovereignty of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East 
Jerusalem, and of the Arab Population in the Occupied Syrian Golan Heights Over their Natural Resources, 
GA Res 70/225, UN GAOR, 2ed Comm, 70th sess, Agenda Item 64, UN Doc A/70/480 (22 December 
2015). 
28 Al-Haq, ‘Annexing Energy’ (2015) 23. 
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Nonetheless, the fragmentation of the Palestinian areas and the aforementioned 
economic constraints give no option for the Palestinian local councils except to sign 
separate contracts with the IEC in order to receive electricity. This, in turn, obstructs the 
Palestinian Government’s endeavours to thoroughly rehabilitate the electricity sector. 
This monopoly affects not only the Palestinian citizens, but also the Palestinian 
distribution companies, such as the Jerusalem Electricity Company.29 The company has 
recently suffered massive debt due to the volatility of the electricity prices that have been 
imposed upon the Palestinians by the IEC, and because of Israeli claims over unpaid bills 
by Palestinians in Area C. Consequently, there have been several incidents of power 
outages and service intermittencies.30 Recently, the Palestinian Government has added 
the electricity debt of some West Bank municipalities to the Palestinian Authority’s 
annual budget in order to alleviate the debt problem and to merge the electricity service 
in these municipalities under the main developed distribution companies.31 Through an 
economic lens, the limited sovereignty of the Palestinian Authority over electricity 
exacerbates the intervals between payments to the IEC, which accordingly results in 
massive annual electricity bills owed by the Palestinian Authority. This, in turn, impacts 
the national budget by increasing the public debt, which impedes the development of 
Palestinian land and resources. 
 
In 2014, the World Bank reported on Palestine’s electricity debt to the IEC for the 
period 2010-2013.32 The report pointed out the major obstacles that have hindered the 
Palestinians from making regular payments for the electricity purchased from the IEC: 1) 
The obstruction of the Palestinians’ ability to check meters that are close to connection 
points with the IEC’s grid; 2) The inflexible electricity prices imposed on distributors; 
and 3) The non-favourable treatment of Palestinian distributors, whereby they are ignored 
                                                          
29 World Bank, ‘Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee’ (2015) 11. 
30 Many incidents of power cuts were documented, and this has become the IEC’s current policy toward the 
Palestinians; see, eg, <www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.644167> accessed 17 October 2015. 
31 Council of Ministers, Decision N 10/16/17 for 2014, Remedy for Electricity Debts of Tulkarm 
Municipality; Council of Ministers, Decision N 11/16/17 for 2014, Remedy for Electricity Debts of 
Qalqelya Municipality. 
32 World Bank Group (n 6). 
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as the largest single customer, along with the forcible surplus charge on the total price of 
electricity that is allocated to support Israel’s renewable projects.33 In addition to 
recommending continuing the reform and the rehabilitation of the electricity sector, 
especially its legal framework, the report recommended that the Palestinians should 
finalise a fair electricity agreement with the IEC to resolve the issues of payment 
progress, reduce the non-payment amounts and set wholesale electricity tariff prices.34 
 
Meanwhile, the increasing population and their growing housing trends are 
pressuring the Palestinian Government to confront the increasing demand for electricity, 
especially in the residential sector, which is the largest with respect to the consumption of 
electricity in the Palestinian Territories.35 The State of Palestine is geographically 
scattered under the Israeli military occupation due to the land separation between the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which is an issue that has hindered the Palestinian 
Government from adopting a unified electricity policy across these regions. Likewise, the 
dispersed inhabited areas in the West Bank have impeded the Palestinians from 
continuously improving their electricity network.36 The fragmented territories are also 
rooted from the interim agreement, the Oslo Accord, which divided the West Bank into 
three jurisdictions: A, B and C.37 
 
In the State of Palestine, the legislation of past regimes—Ottoman laws, the 
British mandate, Jordanian laws in the West Bank, Egyptian laws in Gaza Strip and 
Israeli military orders—has influenced the development of many facets of life, especially 
the regulation of the electricity sector. In fact, some Jordanian and Egyptian laws, along 
with Israeli military orders, remain validly in force and influence electricity management. 
Until 2009, there was no cohesive law to organise and control the electricity sector in the 
Palestinian jurisdiction, which has undermined the government’s efforts to deliver 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 PCBS, Quantity of Electricity (n 14); the total consumption of electricity in Palestine for 2013 was 17050 
T/J and household consumption was 11259 T/J. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Al-Haq (n 28) 8. 
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adequate electricity service to the end consumer.38 Consequently, this lack of control of 
the electricity sector has left consumers under the control of franchised working 
companies. However, in coping with the situation of limited sovereignty, and in the 
absence of the Palestinian Legislative Council, consecutive governments have developed 
regulations that could improve the electricity sector in the Palestinian jurisdiction. In 
order to organise the electricity sector, the government issued the Electricity Decree Law 
in 2009.39 The decree aims to restructure and improve the sector in the area of national 
and foreign investment, and to guarantee a satisfactory power supply and reasonably 
priced service.40 Moreover, the decree stipulates the establishment of the Palestinian 
Electricity Regulatory Council (PERC), entrusts it with financial and administrative 
discretion,41 and determines its duties and responsibilities.42 
 
In turn, PERC has strived to unbundle the electricity service to avoid duplication 
in the practice of the three actions of generating, transmitting and distributing. Therefore, 
as suggested by PERC, the Palestinian Energy and Natural Resources Authority 
(PENRA) attempted to unify, regulate and re-licence the electricity distributors in the 
West Bank under four main companies: the Jerusalem District Electricity Company, 
Northern Electricity Distribution Company, Southern Electric Company and Hebron 
Electric Power Company.43 PENRA and the Council of Ministers issued bylaws and 
instructions to ensure the effective enforcement of the Decree. The electricity tariff, the 
instructions to rectify the status of the companies and the local governing councils, the 
licensing roles and the licensing fees are all legal tools that form the regulatory 
                                                          
38 For example, the Jordanian Electricity Authority Provisional Law N21 for 1967 has partially valid force 
in the West Bank; similarly, the Gaza Municipal (Electricity) By-law 1958 has partially valid force in 
Gaza city. 
39 Electricity Decree Law N13 for 2009 (Palestine) 81 Palestine Gazette 13. 
40 Ibid art 3. 
41 Ibid art 5. 
42 Ibid art 9. 
43 PENRA, Instruction 1 for 2010 Rectifying the Status of the Electricity Companies According to 
Electricity Decree Law N13 for 2009, 85 Palestine Gazette; PENRA, Instruction 2 for 2010 Pertaining the 
Rectifying of the Status of the Local Governing Council According to Electricity Decree Law N 13 for 
2009, 85 Palestine Gazette; technically, the new structuring includes the Gaza electricity companies, but 
practically, the GAZA Electricity Distribution Company is under the control of the government in Gaza. 
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framework of Palestine’s electricity sector.44 PENRA moved forward in restructuring the 
electricity sector and issued the aforementioned instructions 1 and 2 in 2010, which 
called upon companies and local councils to comply with the Electricity Decree Law and 
to rectify their status.45 
 
In order to achieve the restructuring goal, in 2010, the Palestinian Council of 
Ministers also issued the Rules of Licensing Electricity Companies, and two years later, 
in 2012, the Council decided on the regulations pertaining to licensing fees, as well as the 
electricity tariff.46 Nonetheless, in its second annual report in 2012, PERC asserted partial 
compliance with these rules. In fact, more than half of the local councils that are working 
in the field did not comply with the integration,47 a matter which, to some extent, 
influences the performance of some of the distribution companies. Although PERC and 
PENRA have developed the necessary tools to restructure the electricity sector, 
unfortunately, the rules have been somewhat weakly enforced. 
 
III. The Legal Framework of Renewable Energy 
Countries have realised that renewable sources could supportively aid electricity 
production, and therefore, today, renewable sources are increasingly being deployed due 
to rapid improvements in the renewable market and a notable decline in the prices of 
renewable technologies.48 Across the Palestinian Territories, there are several 
geographical locations that have implemented adequate measures to exploit renewable 
energy sources, such as solar, wind and biomass. In fact, scholars have asserted that 
                                                          
44 See further, Council of Ministers, Approval for Electricity Tariff, Decision N 04/14/14 for 2012, issued 
28 December 2012; Council of Ministers, Basis for Licensing Electricity Companies, Decision N 9 for 
2010, issued 15 January 2010, 88 Palestine Gazette. 
45 PENRA (n 43) Instruction 1, art 4; Instruction 2, art 2. 
46 Council of Ministers, Electricity Companies Licensing Fees Regulation, Decision N 4 for 2012, issued 31 
December 2012, 98 Palestine Gazette. 
47 PERC (n 19). 
48 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), ‘Renewables 2014: Global Status 
Report’ (2014) 76. 
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power generation can feasibly occur through the exploitation of these sources,49 and this 
alternative energy can aid in reducing energy imports into Palestine.50 
 
Moreover, the Palestinians’ modest experience shows great potential for 
renewables to have a share in the energy mix. In terms of solar power, Palestine has 
sufficient solar radiation,51 and a history of successful implementation that reflects strong 
potential for solar energy exploitation. In 2015, solar heating systems were widely 
deployed in about 57% of households.52 Further, photovoltaics (PV) technology is 
successfully being used for the electrification of some rural villages in the West Bank.53 
In agriculture, solar power is used for the greenhouses that extend across most of the 
Palestinian jurisdiction. Additionally, biomass energy contributes to 9% of total energy 
consumption.54 In fact, solar, wind, and biomass sources were claimed, when employed 
effectively, to replace 25% of Palestine’s energy demand in 2011.55 In short, renewable 
energy can increase the supply of electricity and support Palestine in independently 
meeting part of its energy demand. 
  
In a legal context, the Palestinian Energy Authority’s Constituting Law first refers 
to renewable energy in its definition of energy as a term. The law stipulates that the 
                                                          
49 See, eg, Imad Ibrik, ‘Energy Profile and the Potential of Renewable Energy Sources in Palestine’ in 
Michael Mason and Amit Mor (eds), Renewable Energy in the Middle East (Springer 2009) 71; Antonis 
Tsikalakis and others, ‘Review of Best Practices of Solar Electricity Resources Applications in Selected 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Countries’ (2011) 15(6) Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 2838. 
50 M S Ismail, M Moghavvemi and T M I Mahlia, ‘Energy Trends in Palestinian Territories of West Bank 
and Gaza Strip: Possibilities for Reducing the Reliance on External Energy Sources’ (2013) 28 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 117, 128. 
51 GeoModel Solar, ‘Atlas of Solar Resources: Palestinian Territories’ (2014) 12. 
52 PCBS, ‘Press Release on Results of Household Energy Survey’ (January 2015), issued 5 July 2015, 
<www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/512/default.aspx?tabID=512&lang=en&ItemID=1439&mid=3172&wversion=Sta
ging> accessed 15 January 2016. 
53 See, eg, Marwan M Mahmoud and Imad H Ibrik, ‘Techno-economic Feasibility of Energy Supply of 
Remote Villages in Palestine by PV-Systems, Diesel Generators and Electric Grid’ (2006) 10(2) 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 128. 
54 MoPAD, Energy Sector Strategy (n 12) 5. 
55 Tareq Abu Hamed, Hannah Flamm and Mohammad Azraq, ‘Renewable Energy in the Palestinian 
Territories: Opportunities and Challenges’ (2012) 16(1) Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 
1082, 1087. 
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research and development of all types of renewables is the responsibility of PENRA.56 
The Electricity Decree Law also refers to renewables in two contexts. The first context is 
the law’s requirement that the Electricity Council shall consider alternative energy when 
deciding upon any new electricity tariff.57 The second context is the law’s clear statement 
that PENRA should support research into alternative energy sources.58 It seems that the 
Electricity Decree Law builds a logical connection between PENRA and the 
Environment Quality Authority. It is a normal relation, especially because environmental 
approvals are necessary to construct any electricity generation plant. This 
complementation is also clear in the Electricity Decree Law’s requirement that 
distribution and generation companies must comply with environmental protection 
prerequisites. Likewise, new projects should conform to environmental law provisions 
and procedures, such as environmental impact assessments, approvals and inspection 
procedures.59 
 
Not surprisingly, in 2012, the Palestinian Government recognised the necessity of 
regulating the exploitation of renewables. The Council of Ministers issued a decision that 
established the legal base for the exploitation of renewables in Palestine, and, in the 
meantime, it approved PENRA’s strategy: namely, the General Strategy of Renewable 
Energy in Palestine.60 The following section addresses the regulatory framework 
components. 
 
                                                          
56 Palestinian Energy Authority’s Constituting Law N12 for 1995 (Palestine) 7 Palestine Gazette 10, art 1, 
art 3 s 7. 
57 Electricity Decree Law, art 13 sub 1. 
58 Ibid art 28. 
59 Ibid arts 6, 17, 27. 
60 Council of Minister, Decision N 16/127/13 for 2012, Pertaining to Regulating the Exploitation of 
Renewable Energy in Palestine; the terms ‘Renewable Regulation’ and the ‘Decision’ where mentioned 
in this paper refer to the above Decision, unless otherwise noted. 
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1.  The General Strategy for Renewable Energy in Palestine 
The target of the renewable energy strategy is for 10% of electricity production to 
be obtained from renewable sources by 2020.61 This percentage equals a capacity of 130 
megawatts.62 The strategy specifies certain prerequisites to achieve this goal. First is the 
approval of legislation and regulations that promote the relevant technologies. Second is 
the adoption of sufficient fiscal sources to provide remuneration for the feed-in tariff that 
foster investment by the private sector. Third is capacity building for the workforce with 
regards to renewable technologies. Fourth is approval of the Palestinian Solar Initiative 
(PSI) 2012-2015. Last is a development plan that improves and promotes renewable 
energy sources through 2020.63 
 
The strategy expects 240 gigawatts to be generated from renewable projects by 
2020, mostly from solar energy. It appears that this figure is a mistake, as the strategy 
projects the generation of a total of 130 megawatts by 2020 in two phases.64 According to 
the strategy, the first phase involves feasibility studies, bid preparation, construction of 
small-scale projects and implementation of the PSI. The first phase started in 2012 and 
extended to 2015, and was supposed to add a capacity of 25 megawatts from potential 
solar energy, wind energy, biogas from landfills and animal waste. 65F65 In fact, the 
implementation of the PSI entails an increase of only 5 megawatts from solar applications 
that will be installed on the rooftops of 1000 households. The participants in the PSI will 
be supported by a feed-in tariff price (included in Appendix 1) and an upfront 
government subsidy. Appendix 2 shows the specific procedures for carrying out the PSI. 
During the first phase, it is projected that the private sector would cover most of the 
project’s cost; meanwhile, the feed-in tariff policy will also spur investors. 66F66 The PSI 
                                                          
61 PENRA, ‘The General Strategy for Renewable Energy in Palestine’ (2012) 
<www.perc.ps/ar/files/enrgy/General%20strategy.pdf> accessed 10 November 2015, 1. 
62 Emma Aberg, ‘Solar Power in the MENA Region: A Review and Evaluation of Policy Instruments for 
Distributed Solar Photovoltaic in Egypt, Palestine and Tunisia’ (Master thesis, Lund University 2014) 29. 
63 PENRA (n 61). 
64 Ibid table 1, 2. 
65 Ibid table 2, 4. 
66 Ibid 7. 
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expects that there will be a vital role for the stakeholders, and it includes implementation 
procedures and a preliminary feed-in tariff (see Appendices 1 and 2 of the strategy). 
 
After an evaluation of phase one’s output, phase two will extend from 2016-2020, 
and the generation of 105 megawatts is predicted by the end of the phase. During the 
phase, a feed-in tariff and direct incentives are the main catalysts for private sector 
investors. The success of the strategy is assumed when institutions and stakeholders 
collaborate collectively and when the private sector makes a substantial investment in 
renewable projects. Reportedly, in Palestine, the share of renewable energy in overall 
electricity generation has reached only 0.02%.67 It is stated that a capacity of 1.25 
megawatts was achieved through the PSI by 2014, but unfortunately this residential 
scheme was suspended due to the government’s insufficient financial capacity.68 
2. The Renewable Energy Exploitation Decision 
In order to facilitate the implementation of the renewable strategy, the Council of 
Ministers issued Decision N 16/127/13 in 2012. The decision regulates the exploitation of 
renewable energy sources in Palestine, and includes in Article 1, for the first time, a 
definition of renewable energy sources.69 Article 2 asserts that the decision approves the 
renewable energy strategy in order to increase the share of renewables in the energy mix. 
The decision adopts the competitive tendering method for the approval of the 
construction of new renewable projects, especially future plants in which the private 
sector will invest. The decision also allows individual investors to submit direct offers,70 
and it grants them the right to install renewable applications. However, the applicants 
must meet the requirements of PERC before applying to obtain the approvals.71 
Additionally, the decision obliges the owners of new renewable plants to sign a 
compulsory purchase agreement with a distribution company. Moreover, the decision 
entrusted PERC with the authority to decide, review and annually adjust the feed-in tariff 
                                                          
67 MAS, ‘Encouraging Solar Electricity Production in the OPT: Is It Just a Slogan?’ (2015) Background 
paper, Roundtable (7) 2. 
68 Aberg (n 62) 33. 
69 Regulation of Renewable Energy in Palestine, art 1. 
70 Ibid art 4 s 1. 
71 Ibid art 4 s 2. 
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price, as well as the prices of renewable electricity.72 To measure the price of output 
electricity, the Council should consider the renewable energy source, the installed 
technology type, the plant capacity and the starting year of the operation. Moreover, 
when reviewing the feed-in tariff, the Council needs to refer and adhere to the criteria of 
the general strategy. By the end of a year, if the Council does not decide upon a suitable 
feed-in tariff, the Council can apply the adjustment index included in the strategy (see 
Table 7 of the strategy).73 Further, the decision exempts the feed-in tariff price from taxes 
and extends its validity for 20 years.74 However, the regulation requires PERC to transfer 
the revenues earned by renewable energy projects and revenues of emissions reduction 
exclusively to the Treasury.75 
 
3. The Law for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
To regulate the exploitation of renewable energy together with energy efficiency, 
the Palestinian Government in the West Bank thoroughly prepared a decree law, which 
was signed by the President.76 Like Decision N 16/127/13, the decree law was issued 
based on the Electricity Decree Law for 2009.77 This paper will only address the updates 
within the decree law that pertain to renewable energy rather than changes related to 
energy efficiency organisation. Initially, the new decree gives renewable energy sources a 
flexible definition by keeping a space to integrate any potential new eco-friendly energy 
sources and avoid the vagueness that existed in the definition included in the decision.78 
The decree law also lays out definitions of renewable energy installations, net metering 
and other essential terms that aid understanding of the law. 79 
                                                          
72 Ibid art 4 s 3. 
73 Ibid art 8. 
74 Ibid art 6. 
75 Ibid art 9. 
76 Council of Ministers, Sending the Draft of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Law to the 
President of the State of Palestine, Decision N 6/51/17, issued 19 May 2015. 
77 The Decree Law N 14 for 2015 Pertaining to Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, 115 Palestine 
Gazette, issued 11 October 2015; throughout the paper, the law is also referred to as the ‘Renewable 
Energy and Energy Efficiency Law’. 
78 Ibid art 1 para 1 the definition of ‘renewable energy’. 
79 Ibid art 1. 
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The law determines the responsibilities of main stakeholders in renewable energy 
development. PENRA is responsible for developing the relevant plans, public policies, 
and strategies that aim to improve the renewable energy sector in Palestine.80 PENRA is 
also responsible for the determination of geographical sites qualified for renewable 
energy exploitation.81 Additionally, it is responsible for adopting standards, 
measurements and technical specifications for renewable energy applications.82 Preparing 
adequate electric tariffs, promotion conditions, connecting fees, issuance of the grid code 
and distribution of the network code are also among PENRA’s responsibilities.83 Further, 
the law entrusts PENRA to prepare the instructions that include the requirements for 
applying and granting the conditions of competitive bids, as well as the instructions for 
direct offers.84 However, PERC is in charge of the instructions of selling and purchasing 
electricity, as well as developing the net metering for renewable energy systems and 
projects.85 The law also sets out the responsibilities of other stakeholders such as the 
Palestinian Electricity Transmission Company (PETL), PEC and distribution 
companies.86 
Significantly, the decree law includes two important obligations: one is that 
distribution companies must connect and purchase the electricity generated by renewable 
energy plants according to future-issued provisions, 87F87 and the other is that PETL must 
purchase all the electricity generated from renewable energy projects and plants.88F88 
Meanwhile, the law forbids any person to generate electricity without approval from 
PENRA.89F89 Another advantage of the decree law is that it explicitly states the adopted 
mechanisms to promote renewable energy exploitation. These mechanisms are the PSI 
with a feed-in tariff (for applications with a capacity below 5 kilowatts in the residential 
                                                          
80 Ibid art 4 para 1. 
81 Ibid art 4 para 2. 
82 Ibid art 4 para 3. 
83 Ibid art 4 paras 6–7. 
84 Ibid art 4 paras 9–10. 
85 Ibid art 5 paras 5–6. 
86 Ibid arts 6–8. 
87 Ibid art 10. 
88 Ibid art 13. 
89 Ibid art 12. 
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sector), net metering (for the installations that have a capacity above 5 kilowatts), and 
competitive biddings.90 
The law also calls on local authorities that confer building licenses, the Engineers 
Association and engineering offices to employ methods of exploiting renewable energy 
resources according to green building codes when preparing buildings’ design sketches.91 
To ensure the diffusion of renewable energy, the law guarantees incentives for all 
renewable energy systems. Application of these systems is eligible for free duties and 
customs, and they come with privileges and exceptions that are included in the 
Investment Encouraging Law.92 The law also gives the government the right to allocate 
government-owned lands and expropriate private-owned lands for the establishment of 
renewable energy generating plants.93 It is also worth noting that the law’s provisions are 
clearly aimed to continue applying the strategy, the PSI and its feed-in tariff.94 
Although the legislators tried to develop a holistic law that overcomes the 
weaknesses of Decision N 16/127/13, the law still refers a number of issues to future 
instructions and provisions, such as the procedures and fees of the connection of 
renewable projects to the transmission grid and to the distribution grid.95 Remarkably, the 
Palestinian Government has prepared and approved the net metering instructions, as well 
as the instructions of building renewable energy plants, through direct offers and 
competitive bidding.96 Further, the law reasserted the adoption of the general strategy as 
well as the PSI.97 
                                                          
90 Ibid art 11. 
91 Ibid art 17. 
92 Ibid art 18. 
93 Ibid art 19. 
94 Ibid art 2 para 1, art 11 para 1. 
95 Ibid art 10 paras 1 and 3. 
96 Council of Ministers, Instructions for Connecting Renewable Projects to the Electricity Grid by Net 
Metering, Decision N 4/77/17, issued 17 November 2015; Council of Ministers, Approving the Instruction 
for Building Generating Plants that Use Renewable Energy, Decision N 11/79/17, issued 1 December 2015. 
97 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Law, art 2 para 1, art 4 para 2, art 11 paras 1–2. 
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IV. Reviewing the Regulatory Framework 
Table 1 summarises how the Palestinian Government regulates the exploitation of 
renewables for power generation and the instruments that it has used. Nonetheless, there 
are basic concerns with regard to Decision N 16/127/13 that may affect the execution of 
the strategy. In fact, Article 1 contains an imperfect definition of ‘renewables’.98 The 
definition makes a broad generalisation by defining renewables as sources that do not 
have any negative effects on environmental elements; that is, species, humans and flora. 
In contrast, the exploitation of certain renewables could have, at the very least, slight 
negative effects on the environment. For example, the exploitation of biomass energy 
could release a small amount of green-house gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere. In fact, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) may help to enlighten the 
Palestinian legislature, because it has adequately defined renewable energy as: 
Any form of energy from solar, geophysical or biological sources that is 
replenished by natural processes at a rate that equals or exceeds its rate of use. 
Renewable energy is obtained from the continuing or repetitive flows of energy 
occurring in the natural environment and includes resources such as biomass, 
solar energy, geothermal heat, hydropower, tide and waves, ocean thermal energy 
and wind energy. 99 
 
Thus, the definition in the decision as well as in the decree law could be revised based on 
the IPCC’s definition. 
 
Another concern is the inadequacy of the financial provisions in the decision. The 
regulation does not guarantee the reliable and practicable provision of finances. For 
example, PERC’s responsibility to transfer the revenues to the Treasury as per Article 9 
is inappropriate. Such proceeds should be retained by PERC, as this may enhance their 
                                                          
98 MAS, Renewable Energy in the Palestinian Territory (n 18) 6. 
99 Ottmar Edenhofer and others (eds), Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation: Special 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2011) 956. 
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administrative and financial powers for renewable energy investment.100 The law, in turn, 
has not mentioned financial provisions relevant to renewable energy deployment. No 
particular scheme, rebate and grant has been mentioned throughout the law. 
 
Another debatable point in the decision is the provision regarding the reduction of 
emissions.101 Palestine has not yet applied any particular regulation, and it has not 
designed any policy that targets GHG emissions; thus, it is too early to refer to proceeds 
that may result from emissions reductions. Conversely, one goal that underlies the 
strategy is the reduction of CO2 (reasons are mentioned in Appendix 1); however, to date, 
Palestine has no market-based carbon mechanism, such as cap-and-trade, or a carbon 
price mechanism, such as a carbon tax. This may be attributed to the trivial levels of 
emissions per capita in the State of Palestine,102 and because its CO2 emissions are within 
the global average.103 The unstable economy as well as the regular deficit in the public 
budget are also major issues that may distract the Palestinian Government from 
developing an appropriate emissions policy. Therefore, it is inappropriate to address the 
issue in the strategy, specifically between feed-in tariff provisions. Given Palestine’s 
economic circumstances, it would be of more use if the government first assessed the 
adequacy of the application of carbon reduction mechanisms in Palestine. Such an 
analysis must also consider the key role of major available renewables that can be 
exploited for the carbon reduction mechanism. Yet, the in-effect laws do not refer to any 
carbon reduction mechanisms. 
 
In terms of fiscal and financial incentives, the decision does not mention 
incentives and direct support from the Palestinian Government.104 PENRA has not been 
                                                          
100 MAS,’The Electricity Sector: Current Status and the Need for Reform’, Final Report Round Table 
Discussion No. 4 (2014) 5. 
101 Regulation of Renewable Energy in Palestine, art 9. 
102 PCBS, ‘Statistical Report on Air Emissions’ (2013), issued 19 June 2013 
<www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_Emissions-air-2011e.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2015. 
103 Maher Abu-Madi and Ma’moun Abu Rayyan, ‘Estimation of Main Greenhouse Gases Emission from 
Household Energy Consumption in the West Bank, Palestine’ (2013) 179 Environmental Pollution 250, 
254. 
104 Regulation of Renewable Energy in Palestine, art 3. 
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successful in determining these incentives. It is inadequate to merely mention the 
incentives related to the PSI in the strategy.105 It is not sensible to rely on the expected 
capability of the government in determining incentives for the medium- and large-scale 
projects that are supposed to be constructed during the second phase (2016-2020).106 
 
Further, the government’s direct support for small renewable applications related 
to the PSI is mentioned but not detailed in either the decision or the strategy. Such 
support needs to be clearly identified to let the public know what financial benefit is 
provided by the PSI.107 However, for household installations, it is asserted that the overall 
cost estimated for each application is roughly USD 2500 in 2013.108 This governmental 
support could arguably be considered upfront production support. However, it is doubtful 
that the Palestinian Government will be able to continue supporting renewable electricity 
projects in the short term. This is because of the lack of financial resources,109 
particularly in light of the electricity debt that resulted from major municipalities and was 
transferred to the government’s budget.110The law, in turn, merely mentions the support 
of a feed-in tariff in accordance with the decision. 111 
 
Stable governmental direct support can influence the renewable market, especially 
in newly emerging markets. Some governments, such as Japan’s, typically support 
renewable projects with special funds that are provided at the early stage for investments 
in renewable technology.112 However, other governments, such as Indonesia’s, promote 
renewable energy using other means through public finances, such as soft loans with low 
interest rates.113 Grants are given to these projects as upfront payments with no refunds 
required; alternatively, support is provided as rebates with repayment required by 
                                                          
105 PENRA (n 61) app 1 and 2. 
106 Ibid 7. 
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instalments, which are sometimes coupled with a grace period. This stable support 
increases certainty and attracts investors to renewable projects,114 and therefore, the 
allocation of adequate direct support should precede the selection of a particular policy. 
In this regard, the International Energy Agency has emphasised that determining 
adequate incentives is one factor that will impact the implementation of the adopted 
policy.115 Conducting a cost-recovery study prior to any approved budgetary support—
especially considering the unstable economic status of Palestine, wherein low income per 
capita is worth noting—may present other adequate alternative financial resources.116 
   
Tax legislation is another preferable supportive tool during the production and 
operation phases of renewable projects. For example, tax credits in the production phase 
are aimed at affording generators or investors a reduction in their tax liability for the 
electricity produced from their utilities.117 Production tax incentives can also be applied 
in different ways by implementing a reduction in property taxes, corporate taxes or sales 
taxes.118 Investment tax incentives can also be used to subsidise renewable projects. In 
contrast to production tax credits, investment tax credits are paid in advance to either an 
investor or a project developer according to the project’s overall capital cost. The amount 
paid is due at the time the project is connected to the grid and starts operating.119 
 
 In the Palestinian context, tax incentives are not discussed within the renewable 
regulation; instead, they are included within the strategy. Such incentives should be either 
included within the relative tax laws or within the Electricity Decree Law with more 
                                                          
114 See also Lincoln L Davies, ‘Reconciling Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In Tariffs’ (2012) 32 
Utah Environmental Law Review 311. 
115 Gabriela Elizondo Azuela and Luiz Augusto Barroso, Design and Performance of Policy Instruments to 
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(World Bank Publications 2012) 6. 
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details. Indeed, Appendix 1 of the strategy asserts that one of the incentives is a tax 
exemption, whereas the decision does not provide further details. Only one tax exemption 
is set out in the decision through the stipulation of the validity of a 20-year tax-free 
tariff.120 Although the type of tax exemption is not specified, it is typically applied to 
income, and it could be considered a tax incentive in the production phase. Due to the 
risks associated with investment in Palestine and the other externalities, supporting the 
construction phase of large-scale renewable projects with a tax exemption is advisable. 
Applying a particular percentage as a tax exemption may assist investors in overcoming 
some of the project costs. In short, the balanced implementation of tax incentives may 
reinforce both large- and small-scale projects. Nonetheless, the Electricity Decree Law 
exempted renewable applications from custom duties, and no tax incentives are detailed. 
Alternatively, the law refer to the Encouraging Investment Law 1998, which includes 
attractive tax incentives and privileges that can strongly spur investment in such 
projects.121 According to the Encouraging Investment Law, and in addition to other 
privileges that attract international investors, the following incentives are applicable when 
investing in renewable projects: 
1. The projects’ fixed assets enjoy free tax and customs, and similarly the 
imported spare parts are applicable when its value does not exceed 15% of the 
fixed assets value.122 The fixed assets are also exempted when projects are to 
be further expanded and developed.123 
2. Every investment project valued above USD 100,000 and less than USD 1 
million, above USD 1 million and less than USD 5 million, and above USD 5 
million is exempted from income tax for five years starting from when the 
production phase begins, and, afterwards, these projects are subject to nominal 
value of 10% income tax on net profit for 8, 12 and 16 years, respectively, or 
for 20 years where the project is capital distinguished.124 
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3. For the public good, the Council of Ministers has the right to extend the 
exemption’s period to an additional five years upon particular criteria,125 and 
the period could be extended for a further two years when national 
instruments and applications constitute 60% of these projects, while the 
Palestinian Authority has the right to give favourable treatment as well as 
special guarantees for national investors.126 
4. The Encouraging Investment Law allows the transfer of exemptions and 
incentives to the new owners of the project where the project continues to 
operate and produce.127 
 
Despite these incentives, international investors are yet to participate in renewable 
energy development in Palestine. However, this could happen after the Palestinian 
Government prepares direct offers and competitive bids procedures. At the time of 
writing, only national investors and the Palestinian Investment Fund had invested in 
renewable energy projects.128 
  
However, the feed-in tariff is a price-based instrument that usually guarantees a 
supportable price for every renewable electricity unit during a fixed term.129 This 
economic tool typically encompasses three basic elements: the purchase price of 
renewable electricity, the duration of the price’s validity and a commitment by companies 
to purchase renewable electricity at the determined price.130 Under a feed-in tariff, 
electricity utilities commit to purchase the generated electricity from renewable energy 
applications at a cost that is either equal to or a bit higher than the price in the electricity 
                                                          
125 Ibid art 24 para 1. 
126 Ibid art 24 paras 3–4. 
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128 Palestinian Investment Fund, ‘Annual Report’ (2014) 24. The Fund constituted investment company 
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market, and it is usually estimated according to the specifications of the technologies.131 
A feed-in tariff policy usually entails that utilities join with renewable electricity 
providers in a long-term contract in order to minimise the risk and to encourage private 
sector investment in the field.132 
 
In the Palestinian context, the rules in the renewable decision describe how to 
estimate the feed-in tariff price, and they identify who is responsible for reviewing and 
issuing it.133 The decision details the tariff prices for 2012 and refers to the strategy to 
determine the tariff price for the PSI. However, the design and rules of the feed-in tariff 
are not well organised. The design of the feed-in tariff would be easy to understand if the 
rules and prices were included in appendices and attached to the decision. Alternatively, 
the feed-in tariff price could be separately issued in a special decision or bylaw due to the 
necessity of an annual adjustment. One simple reason for this is that the feed-in tariff’s 
design not only includes the tariff price, but it also encompasses the rules for its 
estimation and implementation. However, the validity of the feed-in tariff is a concern, 
because the decision determined the validity at a lengthy 20 years.134 This could be a 
long-term binding contract when the Palestinian Government decides to apply another 
suitable instrument in response to decreasing technology prices.135 Binding the 
companies to a 10-year price seems reasonable, especially considering that the payback 
period (as mentioned in Appendix 1 of the strategy) is 8 to 10 years.136 Although a long-
term tariff affords certainty to investors in Palestine, especially under the dominant 
climate of investment, shortening the term of the purchasing agreement may ease the 
adjustment of the tariff price in response to the volatile prices of conventional electricity. 
 
                                                          
131 Edenhofer and others (n 99) 899. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Regulation of Renewable Energy in Palestine, art 6. 
134 Ibid. 
135 PENRA (n 61) 7; the Strategy took into account the declining cost of renewable technologies and 
estimated a cost for intended renewable projects less 20–30% than what is projected. 
136 Pablo del Rı´o, ‘The dynamic efficiency of feed-in tariffs: The impact of different design elements’ 
(2012) 41 Energy Policy 139–151, 148; long duration of support is that between 15 and 20 years and short 
contracts are 5–10 years. 
 
25 
Finally, the decision does not include an explicit obligation for companies to 
purchase renewable electricity from producers. Although this was mentioned in the 
strategy, non-restrictive expressions were used. As an alternative, the decision could 
include the obligation, together with other statements that constitute a right or duty. 
However, the Palestinian Government has reduced the subsidies for fossil-fuel generated 
electricity purchased from Israel. Thus, the fiscal amount saved could be used in 
subsidising the feed-in tariff on renewable electricity.137 
 
Not surprisingly, remuneration can provide more certainty and can lower the risk 
for investors. Here, there are two options for the implementation of a feed-in tariff policy: 
shifting the price gap between the spot market price and the tariff price to end-users’ 
bills, or supporting the gap with governmental subsides.138 Usually, the feed-in price 
contains a remuneration model through which the feed-in tariff can be determined in two 
ways: independent and dependant of the market price.139 The model of the independent 
market feed-in tariff depends on the cost of the renewable technology project, and it 
guarantees a stable price for every renewable electricity unit dispatched to the grid, 
normally in kilowatts per hour.140 This model can be developed in forms such as fixed 
price, fixed price with full or partial inflation adjustment, and front-end load price. In the 
model of the dependent market feed-in tariff, which implements, for example, a premium 
or feed-in premium price, a surplus is added to the actual electricity price, which can help 
investors in estimating the cost of a renewable energy project.141 All of the 
aforementioned price forms aim at fostering the renewable market, but the decision about 
the adequate form depends on the capacity of the Palestinian Government to cover the 
surplus, as well as on how and when the government will achieve its target. 
 
                                                          
137 Council of Ministers, Approval for Electricity Tariff (n 44) art 4. 
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However, the strategy classifies the price of a feed-in tariff based on the type and 
the capacity of the renewable projects, but it neither defines the type of feed-in tariff 
adopted nor determines the reduction formula used for the tariff’s annual adjustment. In 
practice, PERC made a commitment to remunerate distribution companies for 2013.142 
Although the Council adjusted the feed-in tariff for 2013, the feed-in tariffs for 2014 and 
2015 were neither released nor referred to in the adjustment index. This is attributed to 
the suspension of the scheme in 2013. Again, the law adopted the feed-in tariff for the 
residential sector, but the government has not disclosed whether this price is for homes 
connected already or for future participants. In both cases, PENRA should decide the new 
feed-in tariff for 2016. 
 
Meanwhile, in an effort to more prudently consume electricity, the Palestinian 
Government has provided soft loans to encourage only governmental institutions to 
install renewable electricity applications.143 This effort is also aimed at supporting the 
institutions’ energy efficiency. PENRA grants such loans for four years, and a special 
account is assigned for this purpose under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance.144 
The government will also study the capacity for loans that can incentivise residents who 
intend to install renewable applications for domestic electricity use, but do not have the 
opportunity to participate in the PSI. Unfortunately, the law does not mention 
government subsidised loans, rebates and grants, either for the residential sector or for 
investors. 
  
The decision needs to include procedures for choosing qualified locations for 
renewable projects, taking into account limited accessibility to Areas A and B in the West 
Bank. Alternatively, the development of land-use provisions, which identify adequate 
locations for renewable projects and define the easement rights, is crucial for private 
investment. Such provisions can further enhance relationships with other ministries, such 
                                                          
142 PERC, Decision for covering the gap price of feed in tariff, issued 24 December2012 
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143 MAS, Renewable Energy in the Palestinian Territory (n 18). 
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as the Ministry of Agriculture. Identifying the locations may also help preserve landlords’ 
rights and guarantee fair compensation for properties that may be affected when the 
Expropriation Law applies, while also easing the engagement of investors in renewable 
projects. For example, in order to build a new conventional power generation plant in the 
West Bank, the Palestinian Government granted investors the right to use private lands 
under the ‘public good’ principle.145 Unfortunately, this principle has not been extended 
to include renewable energy projects before the law successfully stipulates the right of 
the government to legally expropriate private lands in order to establish renewable energy 
plants.146  
 
In addition, Decision N 16/127/13 does not consider the residents of buildings and 
complexes in its effort to broaden the participation of the public in the PSI. It is important 
to find legal solutions that facilitate the engagement of this segment. Focusing on the 
status of tenants and owners could bring about creative solutions based on property law 
and tenancy law. The PSI only incentivises owners and individuals by applying 
conditions that targets persons who have their own property.147 If tenants are not 
considered, the diffusion of renewable electricity will be slowed. 
 
Auctions can also be a supportive tool in conjunction with the feed-in tariff, tax 
incentives and subsidies. This instrument confers upon the winning bidder the right to 
provide a specified quantity of renewable power, and its ultimate goal is to turn the wheel 
of investment in the renewable electricity market.148 There are three common types of 
auctions: sealed-bid auctions, descending-clock auctions or a hybrid combination of both. 
The use of this instrument has become very common, with nearly 44 countries (30 of 
which are developing) having adopted auctions during the period 2009-2013.149 
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In Palestine, the decision adopts a competitive bid process and directs offers that 
allow the government to approve future generation plant that will exceed 15 kilowatts, 
once the necessary studies are presented, along with proof of previous experience similar 
to the intended project.150 However, the type of auction and the procedures for the 
bidding process are unclear. In order to encourage investors to bid in a transparent and 
competitive process, the auction procedures need to be clearly identified. It is also useful 
to determine whether a descending-clock or sealed auction would be most appropriate. 
However, it should be taken into account that auction schemes have pros and cons. The 
International Renewable Energy Agency has addressed some of the benefits of auctions, 
such as decreasing the risk for investors, achieving cost efficiency, enhancing control of 
the budget and providing competitive prices.151 Auctions also incur downsides related to 
the high level of indefinite opportunities to win the bid and the infrequency of market 
development. Therefore, it is preferable to adopt a descending-clock auction in the 
Palestinian context, because this allows investors to compete under transparent 
conditions, with a determined price and without favouritism.152 
 
Thus, it seems that the Palestinian Government embraced a mixed-instruments 
policy to promote renewable sources of energy. These instruments are: a feed-in tariff, 
tax incentives and auctions. One advantage of this mixed design is that the adoption of a 
feed-in tariff will reduce the investment risk and profit uncertainty for investors when 
they are preparing a cost study for their projects. This policy may also enhance the 
renewable market and encourage mature renewable technologies. Even so, it is crucial to 
consider the transaction costs and the remuneration model, and to bear in mind the lack of 
resources and frequent deficits in Palestine’s annual budget. Further, when using a 
government subsidy together with a feed-in tariff to encourage both individuals and 
investors to engage in the market, the government should secure sufficient resources to 
subsidise the projects. The government needs to give attention to the complex procedures 
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of auctions that may increase their costs. Policymakers need to seek the lowest level of 
incremental costs and subsidies during the design of the policy, before making decisions 
about which economic instruments or policies to utilise. The policy should also have a 
flexible design to enable the government to shift to the appropriate economic tool when a 
feed-in tariff becomes too expensive. The UN Development Programme has suggested 
that Palestinian Government should switch to net metering with no subsides due to their 
unstable financial status. The UN’s report emphasises the effectiveness of solar power as 
a supportive energy, and notes its remarkable recent growth in the Palestinian market.153  
 
 
In 2015, the renewable energy strategy required to evaluate the progress of phase 
one.154 However, no evaluation has been disclosed as yet. If an evaluation finds that it 
was unable to achieve its renewable goal for the first phase, then it policy reform is likely 
required, involving designing a comprehensive policy for the whole jurisdiction, rather 
than one that is applicable solely to one region, namely, the West Bank. Policymakers 
should take the potential resources of the Gaza Strip into account, such as hydropower 
exploitation and offshore wind energy, bearing in mind the restrictions imposed on Gaza 
under the current siege and the recent severe destruction of infrastructure. Therefore, the 
Palestinian Government must consider a unified regulation covering one jurisdiction, 
rather than resorting to legislation duality. If this is difficult to accomplish, then the 
government needs to secure sufficient support or focus on a particular scheme that 
enhances the potential exploitation of renewables in the Gaza Strip in particular, due to 
its difficult position and energy vulnerability. At the same time, the government should 
reform the current renewables decision as well as the strategy to close its loopholes. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that Palestine’s natural environment has sufficient renewable 
energy sources that can be successfully exploited to generate power, especially solar, 
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wind and biomass power. Despite the severe impact of Israeli military occupation of the 
West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, the State of Palestine has made 
progress towards the exploitation of renewable energy sources through a decision issued 
in 2012, as well as a related law and strategy. While these cannot instantly resolve the 
electricity problems by harnessing electricity from renewable energy sources, they are 
significant steps towards gaining electricity independence from Israeli control and 
towards meeting part of the local demand for electricity. 
 
In addressing the regulatory framework of the electricity sector and the 
exploitation of renewable energy in Palestine, this paper has revealed various strengths 
and weaknesses. Palestine inherited a poor electricity sector that is controlled by the IEC, 
and it is influenced by external and internal factors. Therefore, electricity dependency 
along with energy import have negatively impact the real economic development in the 
State of Palestine. On the other hand, the regulatory framework is limited because it is 
only applicable to one region within the Palestinian jurisdiction: the West Bank. In this 
region, the inconstant feed-in tariff policy and the absence of an alternative instrument 
failed to promote significant exploitation by the residential sector, and accordingly the 
policy did not achieve its targeted 25 megawatts by 2015. The Palestinian Government 
needs to consider designing and regularly adjusting a dynamic renewable energy policy 
that parallels the recent enacted law to accomplish the goal of obtaining 10% of 
electricity production from renewable sources by 2020. Therefore, coherent regulations, a 
well-designed policy and financial capacity are the key focus areas required to 
accomplish renewable energy goals in Palestine. 
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Table 1. The regulation of electricity generated from renewable energy sources in 
Palestine 
Subject Tool 
Legal base for 
electricity generated by 
renewable energy 
sources 
Palestinian Energy Authority’s Constituting Law N12 for 1995. 
Council of Ministers’ Decision N 16/127/13 of 2012. 
General Renewable Energy Strategy in Palestine. 
Electricity Decree Law N13 for 2009. 
Decree Law N 14 for 2015 pertaining to Renewable Energy 
and Energy Efficiency. 
Renewable energy 
strategy 
The General Strategy for Renewable Energy in Palestine 
adopted and integrated into the renewable regulation.  
Renewable energy 
target 
Achieving 10% of electricity from renewable sources by 2020 
(25 mw by 2015 and a further 105 mw by 2020). 
Achieving 25% of the energy mix from renewable sources by 
2020. 
Feed-in law A feed-in tariff with a decrement ratio is designed for domestic 
applications. 
A fixed feed-in tariff is designed for large-scale projects. 
Tax incentives Sales tax exemption applies for purchasing costs. 
Financial support The government offers a subsidy for each householder who 
participates in the PSI. A government grant of USD 8000 is 
given to each householder, but this is not documented either in 
the regulation or in the strategy. 
Auctions Auctions are mentioned in the decision, but details are 
insufficient. 
Purchase agreements A 20-year agreement is developed only for the production of 
householders. 
Large-scale projects 
Investment 
Bidders and direct offers are mentioned in the renewables 
regulation, but procedures are not provided.  
Net metering  This mechanism applies to residential applications, but neither 
the regulation nor the strategy disseminate and illustrate it. 
 
